Friday, July 30, 2010

Tuesday, July 27, 2010

China and the String of Pearls

China’s foreign minister warned the United States on Sunday not to internationalise the issue of the South China Sea, where Beijing’s territorial claims conflict with other nations. China and several countries belonging to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) group make competing territorial claims over the resource-rich area, which is also a major source of tension between Beijing and Washington. The United States has called for unfettered access to the area that China claims as its own, and accused Beijing of adopting an increasingly aggressive stance on the high seas.  Read more at Hiram's 1555 Blog

What Is the String of Pearls?

Each “pearl” in the “String of Pearls” is a nexus of Chinese geopolitical influence or military
presence. Hainan Island, with recently upgraded military facilities, is a “pearl.” An upgraded airstrip
on Woody Island, located in the Paracel archipelago 300 nautical miles east of Vietnam, is a “pearl.” A container shipping facility in Chittagong, Bangladesh, is a “pearl.” Construction of a deep water port in Sittwe, Myanmar, is a “pearl,” as is the construction of a navy base in Gwadar, Pakistan. Port and airfield construction projects, diplomatic ties, and force modernization form the essence of China’s “String of Pearls.” The “pearls” extend from the coast of mainland China through the littorals of the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, and on to the littorals of the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf. China is building strategic relationships and developing a capability to establish a forward presence along the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) that connect China to the Middle East (see Figure 1). 

For more on the subject, read String of Pearls, by Lieutenant Colonel Christopher J. Pehrson HERE.

Friday, July 23, 2010

Loose Lips Sink Ships

"An estimated 854,000 people, nearly 1.5 times as many people as live in Washington, D.C., hold top-secret security clearances."

A hidden world, growing beyond control |

Sunday, July 18, 2010


The following article was written by JR Nyquist.
The original can be viewed at FINANCIAL SENSE.
Spymaster, double agent and Russian defector Sergei Tretyakov reportedly died on June 13 of cardiac arrest. The story of Tretyakov's life may be read in Pete Earley's book, Comrade J. According to Earley, Tretyakov was the most important defector in many years, and his motive was to warn the American people about Russia. On Earley's official website we are told that Tretyakov "was fond of saying that the Cold War never ended." The American people, however, are not fond of listening.
It is frustrating to deal with this issue because the "end of the Cold War" is the undying myth of our time. We simply cannot abandon this myth, since our hopes and dreams are predicated upon it. America's last four presidents reiterated, again and again, that the Cold War was over. The news media uses the "end of the Cold War" as a standard line in stories related to Russia. It is convenient to believe what our presidents and our media have been saying. But it is flat wrong. "I want to warn Americans," Tretyakov told Earley. "As a people, you are very naive about Russia and its intentions. You believe because the Soviet Union no longer exists, Russia is now your friend. It isn't, and I can show you how the SVR [formerly KGB] is trying to destroy the U.S. even today and even more than the KGB did during the Cold War."
Most Americans would like to set Tretyakov's warning aside. What does it mean to say that the Russian SVR is trying to destroy the United States? Surely this must be an exaggeration. But no, it is not an exaggeration. If you want to understand Russia's leaders, study the motives of the far Left. For a long time, the far Left has swallowed Russian lies and disinformation. They have come to believe that America is essentially a criminal enterprise. Logically, therefore, they sympathize with the erstwhile goals of the former Soviet Union. And those goals were never abandoned, according to Tretyakov.
Of the important secrets that Tretyakov revealed, the most important was Russia's intentions. Spy satellites cannot reveal this. Only a double agent, from within the enemy's system, who works near the top, can reveal such a thing. You might suppose that anyone seeking to destroy America is insane, that nobody would do such a thing, that no government on earth strives to this end. But you would be mistaken to think this. Consider what a GRU defector, Col. Stanislav Lunev, said about Russia's top leadership:
"These are not human beings. These are crazy persons." And more recently, I should relate what former KGB Lt. Col. Victor Kalashnikov told me on Saturday: "The situation is now becoming more dangerous." Consider the Russian military exercises near the Estonian and Finnish borders."Estonians are quite keen to distinguish between rhetoric from Moscow and real actions," he said. "The Estonian military has studied these exercises. They are of great extent, the greatest since the Soviet Union."
Russia is preparing to dominate Europe. "What is more interesting," said Kalashnikov, "is the timing. Why now?" He pointed to the Persian Gulf situation, which is on the point of escalating. Iran will soon be able to mass produce nuclear warheads. Will the Americans launch a preemptive strike against Iran? Will the Iranians retaliate with terrorist attacks against major cities? You see, Russia is positioning itself to exploit the situation, militarily as well as economically. The Estonians, noted Kalashnikov, "see Russian power growing along the borders of NATO. They see that the West is quite slow to recognize the emerging realities." And it is this slowness, this unwillingness, that leaves us so vulnerable in the weeks and months to come.
America has been penetrated by Russian spies. The American mass media, politics, education and business have been "influenced" by Russian agents. There are those who are so damaged within themselves, that they seek the destruction of their own country. And so, the problem of confronting Russia's war preparations entails a larger problem. It is a problem we cannot deal with. It is the problem of a large and emotionally committed fifth column of deluded individuals. Poisonous ideas have wormed their way into our system, so that the enemy's ideology has become the catechism of the coming generation. Meanwhile, as Kalashnikov explained to me on Saturday: "The geostrategic situation in Europe will change quite soon if the appeasement policy is not changed."
Tretyakov tried to warn the American people, but the American people didn't want to hear. Somehow, despite the fact he was the subject of a best-selling book, Tretyakov's most important message was ignored by nearly everybody. The same happened with Alexander Litvinenko, who was assassinated in London four years ago after attempting to warn the British people that Vladimir Putin was behind the Islamic terrorism, that al Qaeda was led by Russian secret agents. With coverage on Litvinenko's death from major television news programs, not one program mentioned Litvinenko's warning. And now, with Tretyakov's death, not one television news program will mention his warning.
So I am obligated to say something, because nobody else seems willing to step up: The Russian government seeks to destroy the United States and dominate Europe. If we want to honor the memory of Sergei Tretyakov, we need to honor his message.

Tuesday, July 13, 2010

"The Right Honourable" David Cameron continues UK ban of Michael Savage

True to the nature of a world upside down, this “conservative” Prime Minister continues the libelous name and shame policy of The Left - Dishonorable.

The new Conservative Party-led government of Prime Minister David Cameron informed Michael Savage it will continue the ban on the top-rated talk-radio host's entry to the United Kingdom unless he repudiates statements made on his broadcasts that were deemed a threat to public security...

..."I want to thank the 85,000 people who have signed my petition and the thousands who have donated to the Savage Legal Fund," Savage said today.

Read the whole story at WorldNetDaily

Remove Michael Savage's Name From UK Banned List

Michael Savage Reacts to Being Banned from Britain - May 5, 2009

Michael Savage Blasts Brits for Canceling Cambridge Debate - October 7, 2009

Michael Savage Monologue on Day of Cambridge Union Speech Which Savage was Banned

Savage TRN's - Kinks - Living on a Thin Line.wmv

Saturday, July 10, 2010

I Am America

Thank you for spreading the word Colonel6.  Here's Krista Branch's web site -
At 2:04 in the video, you will notice a child hold up a sign that reads "2 Chr. 7:14"...
Second Chronicles, Chapter Seven, Verse Fourteen - If my people, which are called by my name, shall humble themselves, and pray, and seek my face, and turn from their wicked ways; then will I hear from heaven, and will forgive their sin, and will heal their land.

We must never forget to first focus on the Lord in everything we do. PC Pastor Weblog reminds us of Psalm 33:12 - Blessed is the nation whose God is the Lord, the people whom He has chosen as His heritage.

Friday, July 9, 2010

Lost photos of pure hell! Never think it can`t happen again.

Thanks C.D. for sharing these with me.  These photos remind me of a story.  My grandfather and another man from my small town were in the same unit.  They made a pact that if either of them were to make it to Paris - they would urinate on the Eiffel tower.  Thanks to God, they both had their leak and each made it home safely to father many children - of whom I have a life-long bonds to this day.  Praise God for defeating this evil...  And God, help us be wary of it's return.  RarePhotos3eReichRevue

Monday, July 5, 2010

The Price They Paid – Text modified for 100% Snopes truth rating

Have you ever wondered what happened to the 56 men who signed the Declaration of Independence? Listed below are some of the hardships that fell on these great men and their families. Note - some of these events occurred before and some after each particular man added his name to this most meaningful document.

Five signers were captured by the British during the course of the Revolutionary War and endured deplorable prison conditions. Twelve had their homes ransacked and burned, which was commonplace as the war raged. Abraham Clark of New Jersey saw two of his sons captured by the British and incarcerated on the prison ship Jersey. John Witherspoon, also of New Jersey, saw his eldest son, James, killed in the Battle of Germantown in October 1777. Nine of the 56 died during the course of the Revolutionary War.

They signed and they pledged their lives their fortunes, and their sacred honor. What kind of men were they?

Twenty-four were lawyers and jurists. Eleven were merchants, nine were farmers and large plantation owners; men of means, well educated, but they signed the Declaration of Independence knowing full well that the penalty could be death if they were captured.

Carter Braxton of Virginia, a wealthy planter and trader, saw his ships swept from the seas by the British Navy. He suffered grievous financial losses because most of his wealth was tied up in shipping. Thomas McKean had been "hunted like a fox” by the British and was forced to move his family “five times in three months”. He served in the Congress without pay, and his family was kept in hiding. His possessions were taken from him, and poverty was his reward. Vandals or soldiers had looted the properties of Ellery, Hall, Clymer, Walton, Gwinnett, Heyward, Rutledge, and Middleton. Their properties had also fallen into the path of armed conflict being waged on American soil.

At the battle of Yorktown, Thomas Nelson, Jr., noted that the British General Cornwallis had taken over the Nelson home for his headquarters. He quietly urged General George Washington to open fire. The home was shelled, and to this day stands as evidence of the event as part of Colonial National Historical Park – the southeast face of the residence still shows evidence of damage from cannon fire.

Shortly after Francis Lewis signed the Declaration of Independence, the British raided his Long Island estate, possibly as retaliation for his having been a signatory to that document. While Lewis was in Philadelphia attending to congressional matters, the British took prisoner his wife after disregarding an order for citizens to evacuate Long Island. Mrs. Lewis was held for several months before being exchanged for the wives of British officials captured by the Americans. Her captivity was undoubtedly a hardship.

In the winter of 1776, the British overran the area of New Jersey where John Hart resided. His farm was looted and he was forced into hiding.

Lewis Morris saw his Westchester County, New York, home taken over in 1776 and used as barracks for soldiers. He saw the horses and livestock from his farm commandeered by the Continental Army. Shortly afterwards, his home was appropriated by the British. Morris and his wife were able to reclaim the property and restore their home after the war, but Philip Livingston was not so fortunate. Livingston lost several properties to the British occupation of New York and sold off others to support the war effort. His losses were never recovered because he died before the end of the war.

So, take a few minutes while enjoying your 4th of July holiday and silently thank these patriots. It’s not much to ask for the price they paid. Remember: freedom is never free!

Snopes commentary- The signers of the Declaration of Independence took a huge risk in daring to put their names on a document that repudiated their government, and they had every reason to believe at the time that they might well be hanged for having done so. That was a courageous act we should indeed remember and honor on the Fourth of July amidst our "beer, picnics, and baseball games." But let us also not lose sight of the fact that many men (and women) other than the fifty-six signers of the Declaration of Independence — some famous and most not — risked and sacrificed much (including their lives) to support the revolutionary cause. The hardships and losses endured by many Americans during the struggle for independence were not visited upon the signers alone, nor were they any less ruinous for having befallen people whose names are not immortalized on a piece of parchment.

Yes Snopes - the struggle for independence was a team effort. God bless America.

Original Author Unknown – Snopes identified erroneous text removed, modified and replaced per information listed in Snopes analysis last updated: 3 July 2010 (

Photo by stan.faryna - Full-size view of Signers of the Declaration of Independendce, reproduction of the 1936 Faulner mural by Romanian Artist, Gabriel Prundeanu under commission of Stan Faryna. Location: Bucharest, Romania.

Thursday, July 1, 2010

STRATFOR - The 30-Year War in Afghanistan

By George Friedman
The Afghan War is the longest war in U.S. history. It began in 1980 and continues to rage. It began under Democrats but has been fought under both Republican and Democratic administrations, making it truly a bipartisan war. The conflict is an odd obsession of U.S. foreign policy, one that never goes away and never seems to end. As the resignation of Gen. Stanley McChrystalreminds us, the Afghan War is now in its fourth phase.

The Afghan War’s First Three Phases

The first phase of the Afghan War began with the Soviet invasion in December 1979, when the United States, along with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, organized and sustained Afghan resistance to the Soviets. This resistance was built around mujahideen, fighters motivated by Islam. Washington’s purpose had little to do with Afghanistan and everything to do with U.S.-Soviet competition. The United States wanted to block the Soviets from using Afghanistan as a base for further expansion and wanted to bog the Soviets down in a debilitating guerrilla war. The United States did not so much fight the war as facilitate it. The strategy worked. The Soviets were blocked and bogged down. This phase lasted until 1989, when Soviet troops were withdrawn.
The second phase lasted from 1989 until 2001. The forces the United States and its allies had trained and armed now fought each other in complex coalitions for control of Afghanistan. Though the United States did not take part in this war directly, it did not lose all interest in Afghanistan. Rather, it was prepared to exert its influence through allies, particularly Pakistan. Most important, it was prepared to accept that the Islamic fighters it had organized against the Soviets would govern Afghanistan. There were many factions, but with Pakistani support, a coalition called the Taliban took power in 1996. The Taliban in turn provided sanctuary for a group of international jihadists called al Qaeda, and this led to increased tensions with the Taliban following jihadist attacks on U.S. facilities abroad by al Qaeda.
The third phase began on Sept. 11, 2001, when al Qaeda launched attacks on the mainland United States. Given al Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan, the United States launched operations designed to destroy or disrupt al Qaeda and dislodge the Taliban. The United States commenced operations barely 30 days after Sept. 11, which was not enough time to mount an invasion using U.S. troops as the primary instrument. Rather, the United States made arrangements with factions that were opposed to the Taliban (and defeated in the Afghan civil war). This included organizations such as the Northern Alliance, which had remained close to the Russians; Shiite groups in the west that were close to the Iranians and India; and other groups or subgroups in other regions. These groups supported the United States out of hostility to the Taliban and/or due to substantial bribes paid by the United States.
The overwhelming majority of ground forces opposing the Taliban in 2001 were Afghan. The United States did, however, insert special operations forces teams to work with these groups and to identify targets for U.S. airpower, the primary American contribution to the war. The use of U.S. B-52s against Taliban forces massed around cities in the north caused the Taliban to abandon any thought of resisting the Northern Alliance and others, even though the Taliban had defeated them in the civil war.
Unable to hold fixed positions against airstrikes, the Taliban withdrew from the cities and dispersed. The Taliban were not defeated, however; they merely declined to fight on U.S. terms. Instead, they redefined the war, preserving their forces and regrouping. The Taliban understood that the cities were not the key to Afghanistan. Instead, the countryside would ultimately provide control of the cities. From the Taliban point of view, the battle would be waged in the countryside, while the cities increasingly would be isolated.
The United States simply did not have sufficient force to identify, engage and destroy the Taliban as a whole. The United States did succeed in damaging and dislodging al Qaeda, with the jihadist group’s command cell becoming isolated in northwestern Pakistan. But as with the Taliban, the United States did not defeat al Qaeda because the United States lacked significant forces on the ground. Even so, al Qaeda prime, the original command cell, was no longer in a position to mount 9/11-style attacks.
During the Bush administration, U.S. goals for Afghanistan were modest. First, the Americans intended to keep al Qaeda bottled up and to impose as much damage as possible on the group. Second, they intended to establish an Afghan government, regardless of how ineffective it might be, to serve as a symbolic core. Third, they planned very limited operations against the Taliban, which had regrouped and increasingly controlled the countryside. The Bush administration was basically in a holding operation in Afghanistan. It accepted that U.S. forces were neither going to be able to impose a political solution on Afghanistan nor create a coalition large enough control the country. U.S. strategy was extremely modest under Bush: to harass al Qaeda from bases in Afghanistan, maintain control of cities and logistics routes, and accept the limits of U.S. interests and power.
The three phases of American involvement in Afghanistan had a common point: All three were heavily dependent on non-U.S. forces to do the heavy lifting. In the first phase, the mujahideen performed this task. In the second phase, the United States relied on Pakistan to manage Afghanistan’s civil war. In the third phase, especially in the beginning, the United States depended on Afghan forces to fight the Taliban. Later, when greater numbers of American and allied forces arrived, the United States had limited objectives beyond preserving the Afghan government and engaging al Qaeda wherever it might be found (and in any event, by 2003, Iraq had taken priority over Afghanistan). In no case did the Americans use their main force to achieve their goals.

The Fourth Phase of the Afghan War

The fourth phase of the war began in 2009, when U.S. President Barack Obama decided to pursue a more aggressive strategy in Afghanistan. Though the Bush administration had toyed with this idea, it was Obama who implemented it fully. During the 2008 election campaign, Obama asserted that he would pay greater attention to Afghanistan. The Obama administration began with the premise that while the Iraq War was a mistake, the Afghan War had to be prosecuted. It reasoned that unlike Iraq, which had a tenuous connection to al Qaeda at best, Afghanistan was the group’s original base. He argued that Afghanistan therefore should be the focus of U.S. military operations. In doing so, he shifted a strategy that had been in place for 30 years by making U.S. forces the main combatants in the war.
Though Obama’s goals were not altogether clear, they might be stated as follows:
  1. Deny al Qaeda a base in Afghanistan.
  2. Create an exit strategy from Afghanistan similar to the one in Iraq by creating the conditions for negotiating with the Taliban; make denying al Qaeda a base a condition for the resulting ruling coalition.
  3. Begin withdrawal by 2011.
To do this, there would be three steps:
  1. Increase the number and aggressiveness of U.S. forces in Afghanistan.
  2. Create Afghan security forces under the current government to take over from the Americans.
  3. Increase pressure on the Taliban by driving a wedge between them and the population and creating intra-insurgent rifts via effective counterinsurgency tactics.
In analyzing this strategy, there is an obvious issue: While al Qaeda was based in Afghanistan in 2001, Afghanistan is no longer its primary base of operations. The group has shifted to Pakistan,Yemen, Somalia and other countries. As al Qaeda is thus not dependent on any one country for its operational base, denying it bases in Afghanistan does not address the reality of its dispersion. Securing Afghanistan, in other words, is no longer the solution to al Qaeda.
Obviously, Obama’s planners fully understood this. Therefore, sanctuary denial for al Qaeda had to be, at best, a secondary strategic goal. The primary strategic goal was to create an exit strategy for the United States based on a negotiated settlement with the Taliban and a resulting coalition government. The al Qaeda issue depended on this settlement, but could never be guaranteed. In fact, neither the long-term survival of a coalition government nor the Taliban policing al Qaeda could be guaranteed.
The exit of U.S. forces represents a bid to reinstate the American strategy of the past 30 years, namely, having Afghan forces reassume the primary burden of fighting. The creation of an Afghan military is not the key to this strategy. Afghans fight for their clans and ethnic groups. The United States is trying to invent a national army where no nation exists, a task that assumes the primary loyalty of Afghans will shift from their clans to a national government, an unlikely proposition.

The Real U.S. Strategy

Rather than trying to strengthen the Karzai government, the real strategy is to return to the historical principles of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan: alliance with indigenous forces. These indigenous forces would pursue strategies in the American interest for their own reasons, or because they are paid, and would be strong enough to stand up to the Taliban in a coalition. As CIA Director Leon Panetta put it this weekend, however, this is proving harder to do than expected.
The American strategy is, therefore, to maintain a sufficient force to shape the political evolution on the ground, and to use that force to motivate and intimidate while also using economic incentives to draw together a coalition in the countryside. Operations like those in Helmand province — where even Washington acknowledges that progress has been elusive and slower than anticipated — clearly are designed to try to draw regional forces into regional coalitions that eventually can enter a coalition with the Taliban without immediately being overwhelmed. If this strategy proceeds, the Taliban in theory will be spurred to negotiate out of concern that this process eventually could leave it marginalized.
There is an anomaly in this strategy, however. Where the United States previously had devolved operational responsibility to allied groups, or simply hunkered down, this strategy tries to return to devolved responsibilities by first surging U.S. operations. The fourth phase actually increases U.S. operational responsibility in order to reduce it.
From the grand strategic point of view, the United States needs to withdraw from Afghanistan, a landlocked country where U.S. forces are dependent on tortuous supply lines. WhateverAfghanistan’s vast mineral riches, mining them in the midst of war is not going to happen. More important, the United States is overcommitted in the region and lacks a strategic reserve of ground forces. Afghanistan ultimately is not strategically essential, and this is why the United States has not historically used its own forces there.
Obama’s attempt to return to that track after first increasing U.S. forces to set the stage for the political settlement that will allow a U.S. withdrawal is hampered by the need to begin terminating the operation by 2011 (although there is no fixed termination date). It will be difficult to draw coalition partners into local structures when the foundation — U.S. protection — is withdrawing. Strengthening local forces by 2011 will be difficult. Moreover, the Taliban’s motivation to enter into talks is limited by the early withdrawal. At the same time, with no ground combat strategic reserve, the United States is vulnerable elsewhere in the world, and the longer the Afghan drawdown takes, the more vulnerable it becomes (hence the 2011 deadline in Obama’s war plan).
In sum, this is the quandary inherent in the strategy: It is necessary to withdraw as early as possible, but early withdrawal undermines both coalition building and negotiations. The recruitment and use of indigenous Afghan forces must move extremely rapidly to hit the deadline (though officially on track quantitatively, there are serious questions about qualitative measures) — hence, the aggressive operations that have been mounted over recent months. But the correlation of forces is such that the United States probably will not be able to impose an acceptable political reality in the time frame available. Thus, Afghan President Hamid Karzai is said to be opening channels directly to the Taliban, while the Pakistanis are increasing their presence. Where a vacuum is created, regardless of how much activity there is, someone will fill it.
Therefore, the problem is to define how important Afghanistan is to American global strategy, bearing in mind that the forces absorbed in Iraq and Afghanistan have left the United States vulnerable elsewhere in the world. The current strategy defines the Islamic world as the focus of all U.S. military attention. But the world has rarely been so considerate as to wait until the United States is finished with one war before starting another. Though unknowns remain unknowable, a principle of warfare is to never commit all of your reserves in a battle — one should always maintain a reserve for the unexpected. Strategically, it is imperative that the United States begin to free up forces and re-establish its ground reserves.
Given the time frame the Obama administration’s grand strategy imposes, and given the capabilities of the Taliban, it is difficult to see how it will all work out. But the ultimate question is about the American obsession with Afghanistan. For 30 years, the United States has been involved in a country that is virtually inaccessible for the United States. Washington has allied itself with radical Islamists, fought against radical Islamists or tried to negotiate with radical Islamists. What the United States has never tried to do is impose a political solution through the direct application of American force. This is a new and radically different phase of America’s Afghan obsession. The questions are whether it will work and whether it is even worth it.

This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR

Kish Collections: So, why is the United States fighting in Afghanistan?